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1 Introduction
One of the key features of the modern and globalised world is foreign direct investment
(FDI). FDI has increased in both absolute terms, and relative to gross domestic product
(GDP), over the last few decades, and its importance has spawned a fairly sizeable eco-
nomics literature that has attempted to explain its nature, causes and consequences, and
the distinction between ‘horizontal’ FDI (where firms duplicate roughly the same activities
in multiple countries) and ‘vertical’ FDI (which involves firms locating stages of produc-
tion in different countries). However, differentiating between these two forms of FDI has
remained an on-going challenge in the empirical literature on FDI.
From a public economics perspective, a broad consensus in the literature that taxes affect
FDI has emerged,1 but there has been limited empirical evidence on which taxes affect which
type of investment, ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’? Since the motives behind these strategies differ,
contingent on the factors that drive these alternative forms of FDI, the effect of taxes could
also differ. The aim in this paper is, therefore, to explore the interaction between FDI
strategies and tax policy, with a particular eye to whether international tax system rules
matter for both types of investment. It does so by exploiting a large panel with an almost
exhaustive coverage of cross border acquisitions (CBAs)—which has been the dominant form
of FDI-across 30 countries and over a decade (1999 - 2010).
Specifically, this paper makes two contributions. Firstly, and drawing on the work by Fan and
Lang (2000), Fan and Goyal (2006), Alfaro and Charlton (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2009), and
Garfinkel and Hankins (2012), we differentiate between horizontal and vertical investment
strategies. As noted, we use data CBAs which has two important advantages: it is the
dominant form of FDI (UNCTAD, 2000, Di Giovanni, 2005), accounting for as much as 80
per cent of worldwide FDI in any given year and being particularly important in developed
countries (Antras and Yeaple, 2014, p.66); in addition, the coverage of the location choices
embodied in CBAs is extensive, as the data set contains in excess of 80,000 international
deals between 1999 and 2010 across 30 countries.2 Our second contribution is to derive
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1Recent empirical work on the linkages between taxes and foreign direct investment (FDI) have addressed
issues relating to the use of statutory, effective average, or effective marginal rates in measuring the impact
of corporate income taxation and their role in the location decision of firms (as in, among others, Devereux
and Griffith, 1998; Devereux et al., 2002; Devereux, 2006; Buettner and Ruf, 2007), the role of bilateral tax
treaties and international double taxation (as in Bloningen and Davies, 2004; Huizinga and Voget, 2009;
Barrios et al., 2012), the role of non-profit taxes (Desai et al., 2004; Buettner and Wamser, 2009).
2As will be noted shortly below, the estimation is performed by a suitably parameterized Poisson regres-
sion, which aggregates the location choices into a count variable and hence requires a much lower number
of observations for estimation than a model of the (conditional) logit class.
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the tax elasticity associated with alternative FDI strategies and identify which taxes affect
which investment decision accounting also (following Barrios et al. (2012)) for the effect
of international taxation (that is, differences in tax regimes, tax credits and withholding
taxes) across countries. The analysis considers also the role of non-profit taxes on the
location choices of multinational firms.3
The results show that the effect of various forms of taxes upon the incentive of multina-
tionals to invest in a foreign country is broadly negative; this is consistent with much of
the research on taxes and FDI that arises in the public finance literature. For corporate
taxes, the elasticity lies broadly between −1/20 and −9/20. The effect of corporate taxes
depends on the exact measure of taxation, whether the role of the international tax burden
is taken into account, as well as the FDI strategy pursued by the multinational firm. In
particular, double taxation—which arises when the same profit is also taxed in the parent
country and when withholding taxes have to be paid in the host country when repatriating
profits—increases the detrimental effect of corporate taxes on FDI. For sales taxes, the elas-
ticity is around −1/4 but the effect arises primarily with FDI that is driven by a horizontal
strategy, where an affiliate is integrated into the multinational enterprise to access the local
market. Conversely, no significant effect on the sales tax could be found with vertical FDI,
which involves subsidiaries producing export goods, on which the sales tax can normally be
reimbursed at the border.
With the extensive coverage of CBAs, the results in this paper differ from the extant lit-
erature: the estimated tax elasticity is lower than generally reported elsewhere but it also
differs according to the underlying motivation for FDI; the effect of taxes depends on how
double taxation and withholding taxes are treated with again notable differences between
horizontal and vertical FDI; sales taxes do matter but it relates to specific forms of FDI.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a synoptic overview
of the literature to which this paper relates. Section 3 outlines the methodology for identify-
ing alternative strategies for foreign direct investment highlighting the distinction between
horizontal and vertical CBAs. Section 4 addresses issues about the relevant tax measure for
the MNE accounting for additional parent country and withholding taxes which may play
a role in determining FDI. Section 5 presents the location choice framework and discusses
the control variables determining a firm’s decision to acquire affiliates in foreign countries.
Section 6 reports the results. Section 7 summarises and concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is connected with the following aspects of the literature on cross-border acquisi-
tions and FDI, the definition of FDI strategies, and the linkages between taxes and FDI.
2.1 Cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI)
Discussion of the effects of taxes on FDI usually relies on data relating to FDI flows or
stocks or sales from multinational affiliates (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, 2008). Given
data limitations, this has often inhibited a comprehensive coverage of the effects across a
large number of countries over a reasonably long period of time. This paper uses data on
CBAs which, as noted already, presents two main advantages. First, CBAs are typically
3Desai et al. (2004) have argued that, whilst international tax competition has lead to an erosion
of the tax rates on corporate income, other taxes levied on such things as sales or wage payments have
become relatively more important in influencing the decision to invest abroad. Indeed, for the case of US
multinationals, Desai et al. (2004) present evidence that the importance of direct taxes has been decreasing
while the indirect tax burden has increased.
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the dominant form via which FDI occurs and, second, CBA data are now available across
a large number of countries and years. Reflecting this, a growing literature has begun to
use CBA data to address FDI questions. Examples include the role of investor protection
and accounting rules (Rossi and Volpin, 2004), valuation effects in financial markets (Di
Giovanni, 2005; Erel et al., 2012), trade costs (Hijzen et al., 2008), or the effect of the Eu-
ropean integration (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). In this literature, taxes have only appeared
as a control variable on the distribution and growth of CBAs without addressing interna-
tional tax issues. The only exceptions are Huizinga and Voget (2009) who, for a sample
of European countries, have related taxes with the headquarter decisions when firms merge
across national borders as well as Huizinga et al. (2012) who have found that international
taxation affects the takeover premia of CBAs.
FDI and CBAs do not overlap perfectly since a multinational enterprise could also under-
take greenfield investment. The early theoretical and empirical literature on FDI referred
primarily to greenfield investment where foreign plants are built from scratch rather than
being acquired. However, only small changes are required to adapt the standard framework
for addressing FDI to the case of CBAs (Antras and Yeaple, 2014, p.83). Furthermore,
a growing theoretical literature has started to look specifically at FDI through the lens of
international mergers and acquisitions. This implies that FDI can be seen as an outcome
of international market for corporate control, to use the title of Head and Ries (2008),
where multinational enterprises engage in a bidding contest when they want to take control
over foreign assets. From an empirical perspective, this provides the bridge to the location
choice framework applied below, insofar as profits (and hence the bidding capacities) differ
across potential host countries due to e.g. differences in corporate taxes. In this regard,
our empirical strategy follows the approach of Hijzen et al. (2008) and Coeurdacier et al.
(2009).
2.2 Determinants of FDI strategies
Research on domestic and international mergers and acquisitions has been developing across
several sub-fields such as industrial organisation, finance, and international economics. Con-
sequently, a large number of motivations for acquisitions have been identified: synergies,
competition effects, technology transfers, spreading risks by means of diversification and so
on. UNCTAD (2000) gives an overview of the wider considerations that may apply to CBAs
and how the impact of CBAs in the host country may differ from greenfield investment. As
regards corporate taxes, CBAs also raise additional issues associated with transfer pricing
and corporate inversions. Notwithstanding these observations, in this paper, we focus more
directly on the different forms of CBAs which ties with the difference between horizontal
and vertical strategies that dominates in the international economics literature and research
on FDI in general (see Antras and Yeaple (2014) for a recent survey).
Multinational firms pursuing a horizontal strategy seek to access markets by replicating
production facilities overseas whilst a vertical strategy encapsulates the desire to fragment
the production process. Vertical FDI involves the fragmentation of the supply chain, with
the production abroad leading to the export of intermediate goods. Reflecting the different
motives, horizontal and vertical FDI have been mostly associated with investment flows
between, respectively, developed and developing countries. However, the dominance of hori-
zontal FDI between developed countries has been questioned by Alfaro and Charlton (2009)
who show—by directly measuring the vertical relatedness between affiliate activity and the
parent company—that a substantial part of FDI between developed countries is actually
vertical in nature with a large proportion of this being intra-industry (that is, within broad
industry aggregates).4
4The the determination of the FDI strategies outlined in Section 3, follows Alfaro and Charlton (2009).
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Following the discussion above, it is relatively straightforward to apply the various FDI
strategies to the case of CBAs (Antras and Yeaple, 2014, pp.83ff.). In particular, a hor-
izontal motive would imply that a foreign acquisitions involves a target firm in the same
industry to gain market access considerations whilst a vertical motive would imply that a
foreign acquisition involves a target firm on a different stage of the value chain to out-source
production stages.
2.3 The role of taxes
There is a substantial body of research measuring the responsiveness of FDI to corporate
taxes. Early studies drew on statutory rates. Though the corresponding data are read-
ily available for a large number of countries, the rates stipulated in the tax code are not
necessarily appropriate when it comes to the market entry decisions that manifest in the
acquisition of a foreign firm. To more appropriately capture the long-term implications of a
foreign market entry that arise with FDI—e.g. taking into account the capital depreciation
and tax allowances of such investments—the effective average tax rate (EATR) measures
the net present value of tax payments as a proportion of the net present value of pre-tax
capital income (see Devereux and Griffiths, 1998; Devereux et al., 2002; Buettner and Ruf,
2007). Related to the EATR is the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) which measures the
proportionate difference in post- and pre-tax rates of return. This should matter more for
incremental investments in foreign firms rather than the location choices that occur when
taking over control by means of a CBA.
The burden of corporate taxation will also depend on the tax system applied with respect
to credits on taxes paid abroad, the treatment of repatriated profits, or the withholding
taxes imposed in the host country. An early study considering such international tax issues
is Blonigen and Davies (2004), who found little evidence that the existence of a bilateral
tax treaty had an effect on US inbound and outbound FDI. Within the context of CBAs,
Huizinga and Voget (2009) provide a more comprehensive view in terms of compiling data
reflecting the contents of specific tax treaties. They found that differences between countries
applying a worldwide (or credit based) and a territorial (or exemption based) tax system
and the role of withholding tax rates agreed in tax treaties impact upon the parent firm
location in a given country. Without focusing on CBAs, but using a similar approach to
Huizinga and Voget (2009), Barrios et al. (2012) suggest that source and host country taxes
affect the location decision of establishing foreign subsidiaries.5 It is important to note that
the methodology we apply follows Barrios et al. (2012) by relating to the discrete location
decisions of MNEs. However, as discussed in Section 5, our econometric strategy can cope
with the location choices embodied in the enormous number of CBA deals around the world.
While the literature on FDI has primarily considered the role of corporate taxes, according
to Desai et al. (2004) and Buettner and Wamser (2009), other (indirect) taxes may also
matter. This hypothesis rests on the observation that in most countries the indirect tax
burden levied on sales or labour cost of firms can exceed the amounts to be paid in direct
corporate income tax. However, as far as we are aware, the effect of, for example, sales
and labour taxes on CBAs has not yet been established. Desai et al. (2004) argue that,
while the international tax system deals with the role of credits to avoid double corporate
taxation, indirect taxes have no credit system that applies. This, however, is only partially
true when it comes to sales taxes: for FDI that is motivated by market access (horizontal
FDI), it is indeed the case that sales taxes will apply and cannot be credited. But FDI can
also be motivated by the fragmentation of supply chains and foreign subsidiaries producing
intermediate goods that are usually exported back to the parent country (or some other
5While the focus here is on tax elasticities, as we note throughout, there may be many issues associated
with taxes and CBAs. As one of the referees pointed out, the role tax-havens may be a relevant. However,
there is no country in our sample that appears on the OECD tax-haven list.
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country). As sales taxes can usually be refunded at the border, they can be trade neutral
(Keen and Syed, 2006).6
As regards corporate taxation, the differences between greenfield investment and mergers
and acquisitions have appeared in Becker and Fuest (2010, 2011). However, these theo-
retical contributions are mainly concerned with the welfare effects of tax competition and
coordination across different international tax systems. The only paper that has explicitly
addressed the crucial distinction between horizontal and vertical integration is by Mutti and
Grubert (2004). In particular, they conjecture that corporate taxes will have no effect on
horizontal FDI, since the corresponding affiliates will be on the same footing as domestic
firms in the host country. Conversely, high taxes on vertical FDI will place a subsidiary
at a disadvantage, since it will be competing with firms in the source country that have
not invested abroad. The effect of taxes may therefore depend on the motivation for FDI.
However, apart from the lack of account for the role of double taxation and international tax
relief, Mutti and Grubert (2004) also have no direct measure of vertical FDI. Still, the main
merit of the their paper is to tie with the focus of the international economics literature that
MNEs pursue different strategies and that this might matter for the effect of taxation.
In sum, it is clear from the preceding discussion that different taxes can have a differential
impact on the investment decisions of firms to invest in a foreign country. But establishing
the exact effect of those taxes on CBAs necessitates a method that identifies FDI strategies,
together with a careful consideration of double tax issues. It is the former issue that we
next turn to.
3 Horizontal and vertical CBAs
Driven by the availability of detailed tax data, we focus on international CBAs between 32
source and 31 host countries.7 During the 1999 to 2010 period, according to SDC Platinum
of Thomson Reuters, these countries have witnessed 82,182 deals and accounted for more
than 90 per cent of the total number CBAs around the world. SDC Platinum has been used
elsewhere for empirical research on CBAs. Early studies (among others, Rossi and Volpin
(2004) and Di Giovanni (2005)) have relied on the aggregate value of the reported deals
between pairs of source and host countries. The caveat against this is that in the majority
of cases, the deal value has not been disclosed by the merging firms (Di Giovanni, 2005,
p.134). To avoid this missing data problem, the literature (see, for instance, Herger et al.
(2008), Hijzen et al. (2008), Huizinga and Voget (2009), and Erel et al. (2012)) has relied
on the number of deals, which is almost exhaustively available, since SDC records virtually
any change in ownership of at least 5 per cent.8
To disentangle the impact of taxation across FDI strategies, the challenge is to distinguish
between horizontal and vertical CBAs. For each deal, SDC Platinum reports standard
industry classification (SIC) codes of the acquirer and foreign target firm at the 4-digit
level denoted here by, respectively, SICa and SICb.
9 This provides the basis to uncover
the industrial relationship between the merging firms. In particular, when SICa = SICb,
an acquisition involves firms operating in the same industry, which is a typical feature of
horizontal integration.
6Desai and Hines (2005) find the VAT to have a negative effect on net exports though they put this down
to inefficiencies in the VAT rebate system across the panel of countries they cover.
7The list of countries can be found in the data appendix.
8Results between count and value data can, of course, differ since they refer, respectively, to the effect of
taxes on the location choice of a multinational firm and the amount to invest, once the decision to enter a
foreign market has been taken. Econometric issues arising with event counts are discussed in Section 5.
9To accurately identify investment strategies pursued by multinational firms, Alfaro and Charlton (2009)
strongly advocate the use of a highly disaggregated classification at the four-digit level. Arguably, this
avoids the misclassification of a considerable number of acquisitions involving firms in adjacent industries as
horizontal acquisitions.
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When tying down vertical acquisitions, however, it is not sufficient to observe that the SIC
codes of the acquiring and target firms differ; one also needs a direct measure of vertical
relatedness that will explicitly identify the links within the supply chain. Therefore, we
draw on the methodology of Fan and Lang (2000) and Fan and Goyal (2006), who have
derived a measures of vertical relatedness from the input:output structure of commodity
flows between around 500 intermediate industries using US accounts. More specifically, for
every pair of industries, SICa and SICb, the input:output tables allow the calculation
of the value of sales from SICa required to produce a dollar’s worth of SICb. The higher
this measure—called the vertical relatedness coefficient and denoted by Vab—the greater
the degree to which the corresponding industries are linked through the supply chain. By
defining a benchmark V , it is then possible to identify deals between firms operating in
industries with Vab > V that are deemed to be vertically related. Following Alfaro and
Charlton (2009), the 5 per cent benchmark for V will be used for the baseline results whilst
the 1 and 10 per cent values will be used for robustness checks.
One potential issue in matching SIC codes is that firms often operate in several industries;
the SDC database reports up to 6 different SIC codes for both acquiring and target firms.
To reflect the prevalence of diversified multinational firms, we analyse the horizontal and
vertical relatedness between an acquirer, denoted by r, and target firm, denoted by s, across
every potential pair of industries in which they operate. Since there are up to 6 industries for
acquiring and a target firm there are up to 36 pairs which imply the following classification:
as to whether CBAs involve firms that are horizontally, that is SICra = SIC
s
b , or vertically,
that is V rsab > V , related:
(i.) ‘Pure horizontal’ acquisitions between acquiring and target firms sharing at least one
combination of 4-digit SIC codes, but are vertically unrelated in any of the 36 possible
combinations of SICra and SIC
s
b ; and
(ii.) ‘Pure vertical’ acquisitions between acquiring and target firms related in at least one
combination of industries through the supply chain, but have no common industry
codes for across the (up to) 36 combinations of SICra and SIC
s
b codes.
Table 1 formalises the definition of the alternative FDI strategies.10
Table 1: Definition of horizontal and vertical FDI
FDI strategy Horizontal relatedness Vertical relatedness
Pure horizontal ∃ r, s such that SICra =SICsb V rsab < V , ∀ r, s
Pure vertical SICra 6= SICsb , ∀ r, s ∃ r,s such that V rsab > V
The distribution of the 82,182 CBAs between 1999 and 2010 in the sample of source and
host countries is reported in Table 2. The second column shows the breakdown of all deals
across the top 10 source and host countries. Notice that the same developed countries, that
is the US, the UK, Canada, Germany, and France, are the most important source and host
nations for CBAs and that they alone account already for more than half of all deals.
Using the methodology of Table 1, the alternative investment strategies characterising these
CBAs are reported in the remaining columns of Table 2. Of the total number of acquisitions,
10Notice that the classification can also produce less clear outcomes. For example, acquisitions involving
firms in the same SIC also pass the measure of vertical relatedness. This would be compatible with complex
strategies combining several motives for FDI as discussed in, for example, Yeaple (2003). However, to avoid
ambiguities and produce a close concurrence with the established theories on FDI strategies, the analysis
will focus on acquisitions that are ‘purely’ horizontal or vertical according to the definition of Table 1.
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Table 2: Number of CBAs, 1999-2010
All CBAs Horizontal
(V=5%)
Vertical (V=5%)
Top 10 Source Countries
United States 20,064 3,113 6,130
United Kingdom 10,892 2,275 2,916
Canada 7,248 1,226 2,514
Germany 5,927 1,089 1,811
France 5,698 1,507 1,608
Netherlands 3,777 796 1,111
Sweden 3,216 754 870
Switzerland 2,992 602 864
Australia 2,832 480 814
Japan 2,654 330 939
.. ... ...
Total 82,182 15,671 24,250
Top 10 Host Countries
United States 16,440 3,159 5,136
United Kingdom 9,320 1,832 2,864
Germany 7,159 1,293 2,107
Canada 5,815 970 1,657
France 4,921 931 1,387
Spain 3,096 770 756
Australia 3,052 413 881
Sweden 2,921 601 867
Italy 2,871 613 762
Netherlands 2,727 494 838
.. ... ...
Total 82,182 15,671 24,250
around 50 per cent of all deals are classified as purely horizontal or vertical. Using the 5
per cent benchmark for V , 19 per cent are classified as ’pure’ horizontal and 37 per cent as
’pure’ vertical. Substantial shifts in the distribution of FDI strategies arise when alternative
benchmarks are used for V . Specifically, with the 10 per cent benchmark employed (which
raises the threshold of vertical relatedness defining that industries are connected through
the supply chain), around 29 per cent are classified as ‘pure’ horizontal and 11 percent as
‘pure’ vertical acquisitions. Conversely, with the 1 per cent benchmark employed (which
lowers the threshold for defining vertical integration), vertical deals dominate with 57 per
cent whilst only 8 per cent of all CBAs would be deemed to be horizontal. Hence, a shift
between the conventionally used benchmark values V has a substantial effect on the empirical
distribution between horizontal and vertical strategies meaning that it will be important to
make this distinction when establishing the effect of taxes on CBAs below.
4 Double taxation and international tax relief
Aside from the distinction between statutory and effective tax rates discussed in Section 2,
international tax matters—and, in particular, double taxation and international tax relief—
influence investment decisions. Following Huizinga and Voget (2009) and Barrios et al.
(2012), the consolidated tax burden, denoted by τijt, from FDI between source country i
into host country j during year t is given by
τijt = τjt + τit + (1− τjt)ωijt, (1)
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where τjt is the host country tax rate, τit is the source country i tax rate, and ωijt captures
any withholding taxes when multinationals repatriate the after-tax profits, given by (1−τjt),
to the source country i. Since most FDI is subject to some double tax relief, the tax rate in
(1) is rarely applied in practice. The amount of double tax relief depends on the international
tax system—that is, whether the source country applies a territorial or worldwide regime
where international tax relief occurs, respectively, through exemptions and tax credits—
and whether the source and host country have signed a bilateral tax treaty stipulating the
tax system that applies between them or the maximum amount of withholding taxes. In
countries with a territorial tax system, foreign profits are exempted from domestic taxation
implying that τit = 0. The international tax burden on the multinationals is, then,
τeijt = τjt + (1− τjt)ωijt. (2)
In countries with a worldwide system, domestic corporate taxes must be paid even if the
profits have been earned abroad but, to reduce the double tax burden, firms can earn credits
on foreign tax payments.11 The international tax burden on the multinationals is, then,
τijt = τit + τjt + (1− τjt)ωijt − cijt, (3)
where cijt denotes the tax credits.
With an indirect tax credit system corporate and withholding taxes are both creditable,
that is ciijt = τjt + (1 − τjt)ωijt whereas direct tax credits apply only to withholding taxes
meaning cdijt = (1− τjt)ωijt. Since the tax credit is restricted to the tax burden that would
accrue to the same profit in the parent country, we have that ciijt = min[τit, τjt+(1−τjt)ωijt]
and cdijt = min[τit, ωijt] (Huizinga and Voget, 2009, p.1223). In sum, the international tax
burden equals
τ iijt =
{
τj,t + (1− τjt)ωijt if τjt + (1− τjt)ωijt > τit
τit if τjt + (1− τjt)ωijt < τit, (4)
for the indirect tax credit system and
τdijt =
{
τjt + (1− τdjt)ωijt if ωijt > τit
τjt + (1 + ωijt)τi,t if ωijt < τit,
(5)
for the direct tax credit system (see also Barrios et al., 2012, pp. 949ff.).12
One issue in dealing with double taxation and international tax relief is the potential to
defer the repatriation of profits and, hence, postpone the payment of corporate taxes in the
home country.13 In practice, it is difficult to establish whether a firm has an incentive to
keep unrepatriated profits in an acquired subsidiary abroad (see Huizinga and Voget, 2009,
pp.1230ff.). Furthermore, most countries impose complex rules and regulations as regards
the repatriation of foreign profits. Hence, one merit of distinguishing between the effect of
host country taxes τjt and the international tax burden τijt is that this might shed light into
the importance of deferral (Barrios et al., 2012, p.951). In particular, a lower impact of τijt
compared with τjt could suggest that the repatriation of profits is often deferred to a degree
11During the period under consideration, a number of countries have switched from a credit based towards
an exemption based system. Examples include the Czech Republic (2004), Norway (2004), Poland (2007),
Japan (2009), and the United Kingdom (2009) with the year of the transition reported in parentheses.
12Before changing to an exemption based system in 2004, the Czech Republic used a deduction based
system where foreign taxes can be subtracted from the domestic taxable profits. According to Barrios et al.
(2012), the international tax rate is then equal to 1− (1− tit)(1− τjt)(1− ωijt).
13Another issue is that effective tax rates are usually calculated for local conditions, whilst in an interna-
tional context, the tax burden on an investment depends also on the conditions abroad. This could give rise
to non-linearities between, say, withholding and effective corporate taxes. As in Huizinga and Voget (2009)
and Barrios et al. (2012), these complex second order effects are neglected here. Recent data accounting for
this are only available for a set of European countries (see ZEW, 2008).
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where issues of double taxation are of minor concern. A possible difference with the host
country tax effect can arise from both the withholding tax ωijt or the additional corporate
taxes that can accrue, in particular, in parent countries with a worldwide tax system. In
sum, we will use the host country tax τjt, measured with the statutory or effective rates, as
baseline variables as well as (2) to (5) to infer the effect of international double taxation on
CBAs.
For a set of European countries, Huizinga and Voget (2009) and Barrios et al. (2012)
provide detailed information about the tax system as well as the withholding tax rates that
apply according to bilateral tax treaties. To calculate the international tax burden, we have
compiled some new data that also cover major countries outside Europe that appear in
our common sample including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Japan, Mexico, Singapore, the US, and South Africa.14 To concur with Huizinga and Voget
(2009) and Barrios et al. (2012), profits are assumed to be repatriated in form of dividends.
As mentioned above, non-profit taxes might also matter for the location choice of firms. To
account for this, we follow the literature (Desai et al., 2004; Buettner and Wamser, 2009)
and include the rates of value-added and other sales taxes in the host country. Furthermore,
labour taxes and the amount of compulsory social security contributions to be paid in each
country might be relevant when the desire to outsource labour intensive production stages
to low wage countries provides the motive for acquiring a foreign firm. Following Braconier
et al. (2005), labour tax data have been extracted from the Prices and Earnings survey of
UBS (various years).15
5 A location choice framework for CBAs
CBAs encapsulate a decision to locate economic activities in a given host country. Therefore,
the analysis of this data is conducted within a location choice framework, which models the
host country decision embodied in each deal. 16 Specifically, the desire to acquire a foreign
subsidiary rests on the opportunity to generate an income stream of R and, thus, earn an
expected profit of
pidijt = (1− τijt)R
(
xijt, τ
o
jt, δi, δj , δt
)
(6)
whose value depends, in turn, on several factors.17 In particular, as discussed above, firms are
thought to be reluctant to invest in the face of high tax rates τijt levied directly on corporate
income, but also other forms of taxation τojt accruing, for example, to the value-added
component of R. The control variables are summarised in xijt. Year specific components
δt absorb global developments within the international market for corporate control that
sustain the observed wave-like pattern in international merger activity (see Di Giovanni,
2005). Finally, δi and δj absorb all factors that are specific to, respectively, the source and
host countries.
Equation (6) forms the basis for our empirical strategy. However, expected profits piijt are
not directly observable. Therefore, we follow a growing literature (see, for example, Devereux
14The sources to compile this information were the Corporate and Indirect Tax Survey of KPMG (various
years), the Deloitte International Tax Source (DITS), the country-specific lists of double taxation treaties
of UNCTAD, as well as information published by the relevant national tax authorities.
15Buettner and Wamser (2009) also consider the role of import duties and excises for which they find
no effect on the location choice of German multinationals. Since the trade freedom variable, discussed in
Section 5, already contains a component measuring the tariff barrier in each country, we have not included
a separate variable for import duties and excises.
16This paper, therefore, departs from the bulk of the empirical literature which measures the impact of
taxes upon aggregate stocks and flows of FDI by means of gravity equations. Though similar variables
are employed, it is important to emphasize that the specification of location choice models differs from the
standard gravity equations. Above all, location choice models are highly non-linear since they draw on
extreme value distributions identifying the best option available. Therefore, the handling of country and
time-specific effects differs fundamentally from linear gravity equations.
17See Devereux and Griffith (1998) for a similar specifications to modeling the profits of multinationals.
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and Griffith, 1998; Buettner and Ruf, 2007; Buettner and Wamser, 2009; Barrios et al., 2012,
and Head and Ries, 2008) exploiting the fact that observed CBA deals encapsulate a location
choice that identifies the country with the highest expected profit opportunity, that is
hdijt =
{
1 pidijt > pi
d
ij′t ∀j′ 6= j
0 otherwise,
(7)
where j′ denotes alternative hosts where a firm could, in principle, also have made an acqui-
sition. Insofar as taxes affect the profits according to (8), they determine the desirability of
multinational firms to bid for foreign firms in various host countries and manifest themselves
finally in the market entry decision of hdijt.
The regression equation related with (6) is given by
pidijt = x˜jtβ + τ˜ijtγ + δi + δj + δt + ijt, i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , J ; t = 1, . . . , T, (8)
where x˜ijt = ln(xijt) and τ˜ijt = ln(τijt), and β and γ are coefficients to be estimated, and
ijt is a deal-specific error term.
Aside from the details of the tax variables τ˜ijt that have been discussed in the previous
section, the set of control variables x˜ijt accounts for the established factors to explain the
location choices of multinational firms. In particular, real GDP in the host country reflects
the market access motive of FDI. The expected sign is positive since it is more likely that
a multinational firm acquires a target in a larger economy. Higher wage costs are expected
to have a negative effect on the decision to locate in any specific country. Owing to the
separate inclusion of labour taxes, a measure for wages net of payroll taxes and compulsory
social security contributions is used. Even when wages are low, multinational firms might
be reluctant to enter foreign markets with rigid labour market regulations. This is proxied
by an index on labour market freedom. The distance between the source and host countries
as well as whether they share a common border account for the effect of geography on FDI.
Trade freedom is an index that captures the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade
in the host country. For the multinational firm, this will matter when intermediate goods
provide inputs for foreign subsidiaries or given that exports (subject to trade costs) can be
used as an alternative strategy to establishing a local plant when serving a foreign market.
Other factors which influence the openness of the country to FDI are given by investment
freedom, an index measuring whether the government treats foreign firms in the same way
as domestic investors, whether specific industries are closed to investment, whether govern-
ments impose restrictions on capital transactions and transfers—the expected effect of this
variable is positive. An index on shareholder rights controls for the role of corporate gover-
nance, emphasised in Rossi and Volpin (2004), when acquiring a foreign firm. During the
period under consideration, a number of countries joined the European Union or adopted
the Euro as a common currency. Following Coeurdacier et al. (2009), this will be reflected
by two sets of dummy variables reflecting, respectively, whether source and host country or
only the host country are a member of the European Union or the Euro. Finally, exchange
rates are also a likely determinant of FDI. Following Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen
(1997), a (real) appreciation of the currency of the host country is expected to have a nega-
tive effect since this makes a foreign acquisition more expensive when expressed in the home
currency. Detailed definitions and data sources as well as the summary statistics for each of
the variables are reported in the data appendix.
Head and Ries (2008) have developed a framework to theoretically model the bidding process
that occurs when FDI is thought to arise via the international market for corporate control.
One of the main ingredients of their approach is that the deal specific component error term
ijt is assumed to follow a Gumbel, or type I extreme value distribution, to reflect that the
highest bid is going to win in a stylised auction for the control of a foreign target. From
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this, it is a short step to see that the probability that a firm of source country i acquires a
target in country j during year t takes a multinomial logit form, that is
P dijt = Pijt =
exp(x˜ijtβ + τ˜ijtγ + δj)∑I
i=1
∑M
l=1
∑T
t=1 exp
(
x˜iltβ + τ˜iltγ + δj
) . (9)
Owing to the exponential nature of (9), the components δi and δt pertaining, respectively, to
source countries and years drop out. Thus, only variables such as taxes that differ across the
alternatives, that is the host countries j, affect the location choice embodied in each CBA
deal. In other words, location choice approaches obviously exploit the heterogeneity in, say
taxes, arising between the locations a multinational firm can potentially choose from.18
Though models of the (binary, conditional, and nested) have been used to estimate how
corporate taxes impact upon location choices such as hdijt (see, for example, Devereux and
Griffith, 1998; Buettner and Ruf, 2007; Buettner and Wamser, 2009; Barrios et al., 2012),
their main limitation is the massive number of observations in a sample encompassing a large
number of countries and years as we have here. For example, our sample with 82,182 CBA
deals and 31 potential host countries would have necessitated the compilation of a dataset
with around 2,500,000 observations. However, the issue that location choice models of the
logit class can become very cumbersome to estimate can be avoided by turning to the Poisson
regression (Guimara˜es et al., 2003), which has the advantage of requiring a substantially
smaller number of observation to obtain the same coefficients (see also ; Schmidheiny and
Bru¨lhart, 2011; Herger and McCorriston, 2013).19 In this case, the interpretation of the
coefficients, such as γ, pertaining to logarithmically transformed coefficients, such as τjt, is
that of a constant (tax) elasticity. Appendix C provides the technical details.
The present location choice framework for CBAs has benefits in that it is embedded in the
profit function (6) that can be turn connected with theoretical models of FDI and CBAs.
However, there are also some limitations. Firstly, the choice is here over the acquisition of
a foreign subsidiary and, in the version above, does not contemplate other dimensions such
as the difference between mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investment (Becker and
Fuest, 2011) or the choice of headquarter (Huizinga and Voget, 2009). Also, firm specific
considerations such of profit shifting and tax planning drop out with the deal specific com-
ponent δd. Nevertheless, tax effects on location choices by means of CBAs are an important
part of international tax competition and the current framework provides a comprehensive
and tractable method to estimate the corresponding effects. The next section will turn to
the results.
6 Results
6.1 Baseline results
Table 3 reports the results connecting the econometric approaches that are based on the
location choice revealed from CBA deals with the empirical literature on FDI and taxes.
Ignoring for the moment additional parent country and withholding taxes, Columns 1 and
2 employ statutory tax rates, Columns 3 and 4 effective average tax rates, and Columns 5
and 6 effective marginal tax rates to measure τjt. Columns 2, 4, and 6 consider this with the
inclusion of other taxes levied on sales and wage payments. The results refer to the number
of CBAs during the 1999 to 2010 period with 82,182 observed deals between 32 source and
31 host countries for which detailed tax data were available (see data appendix). The sample
18One should be aware of the deviations from conventional gravity equations. Owing to the non-linear
nature, even with time-dummy variables δt, a time-constant variable can enter the location choice model as
long as its values differ across the different options (here host countries j).
19For a smaller sample with location choices by US multinationals, the exact overlap of the estimated tax
effects between the conditional logit model and the Poisson regression is shown in Herger et al. (2011).
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involves an unbalanced panel with 11,248 observations covering 379 pairs of source countries
and years.20
Inspection of the results across the six specifications of Table 3 reveals that the coefficients
of the control variables concur with the theoretical priors. In particular, economic size, a
cheap foreign currency, the proximity between countries, institutional quality (in terms of
investment and labour market freedom and the protection of shareholder rights), and joint
membership of the Euro Zone significantly enhance a country’s capacity to attract CBAs.
EU membership and trade freedom have an insignificant effect, which might reflect that the
trade barriers within our sample with mainly developed host countries are already relatively
low. The effect of wage cost is also insignificant. Again, within the current sample with
mainly developed countries, the desire to outsource labour intensive production processes to
low wage countries is apparently not a key factor driving international acquisitions. Note,
however, that the variable that measures labour market flexibility is significant.
With respect to taxation, as noted above, there is broad evidence that corporate taxes
reduce a country’s capacity to attract FDI. This is confirmed by the results of Table 3,
where corporate taxes τjt, measured by statutory and effective average rates in Columns 1
to 4, have a negative and significant effect on CBA activity. With the EMTR, an insignificant
coefficient arises in Columns 5 and 6. This is perhaps not surprising since effective marginal
tax rates should matter for incremental investments affecting the value of FDI rather than
the discrete location choices associated with the number of CBAs.21 Interestingly, compared
with the vast literature on the effect of taxes on FDI, the values of the elasticities are
relatively low.
Other dimensions of taxation matter for international investment decisions. For the sample
covering all CBAs, relatively high sales taxes reduce the probability that a foreign country
attracts an acquisition. This coincides with the findings of Desai et al. (2004) about the
effect of indirect taxes on the affiliate sales of US multinationals, but differs from Buettner
and Wamser (2009), who found that sales taxes had no significant effect on the location
choice by German multinationals. Taxes levied on wage payments have no significant effect
on the location choices inferred from CBA deals. This result coincides with that of Buettner
and Wamser (2009), who attributed this to a scenario where labour is inelastically supplied,
and internationally immobile, and as such they bear the labour tax burden.
6.2 International tax effects
Table 4 extends the analysis of the impact of taxes upon CBAs by accounting additional
parent country and withholding taxes. As discussed in Section 4, multinational firms can
be subject to double taxation. Specifically, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 consider the effect
the international corporate tax burden τijt that depends, according to equations (2) to (5),
on such things as the international tax system, the double tax relief stipulated in bilateral
tax treaties, or the withholding tax rate ωijt when repatriating profits from host country j
to parent country i.
20As noted in Section 5 and shown in Appendix C, the coefficient estimates that resulted from a fixed
effects Poisson regression are identical with those of a conditional logit model for the location choice of host
countries j.
21We have also experimented with some regressions using the deal value of CBAs as the dependent variable.
Recall, from the discussion of Section 3, that these data are highly incomplete in the sense that for the
majority of CBAs, SDC Platinum did not report the deal value. Furthermore, a preponderance of the
aggregate deal values between source and host countries during a given year were zero-valued. This issue
could be tackled with either a Tobit regression or a pseudo Poisson maximum likelihood approach. In both
cases, when using aggregate deal values, a significant effect did arise with the EMTR. However, as mentioned
above, the incompleteness of the value data introduce severe caveats. Therefore, we do not report and discuss
these results here.
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Table 3: Results for statutory and effective tax rates
Corporate Tax: Statutory Rate EATR EMTR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.38***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Net Wage 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Distance -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Border 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Investment Freedom 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Trade Freedom -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Labour Market Freedom 0.40*** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.30** 0.30** 0.24*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Shareholder Rights 1.47*** 1.45*** 1.43*** 1.42*** 1.37*** 1.36***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
EUit*EUjt -0.51 -0.50 -0.51 -0.50 -0.50 -0.49
(0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57)
(1-EUit)*EUjt -0.01 0.001 -0.01 0.001 0.004 0.01
(0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57)
Euroit*Eurojt 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(1-Euroit)*Eurojt -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.39***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Exchange Rate -0.54*** -0.54*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.58*** -0.58***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Corporate Tax (τjt) -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.04 -0.04
(Host Country) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Sales Tax -0.19*** -0.15** -0.15***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Labour Tax 0.06 0.07 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
#cba 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182
#obs 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248
lnL -26,079 -26,075 -26,081 -26,079 -26,085 -26,082
Notes: The dependent variable is the number nijt of CBA deals between source country i and
host country j during year t. Estimation is by maximum likelihood of a Poisson regression
with fixed effects αit. Aside from the dummy variables (Border, EU, Euro), the explanatory
variables have been transformed into logarithms such that the coefficients reflect constant
elasticities. All specification include host country dummy variables δj . For the 1999 to
2010 period, the data cover all CBAs between the 32 source and 31 host countries listed in
the data appendix. Furthermore, #cba is the total number of deals, #obs is the number
of observations, and lnL the maximised value of the log likelihood function of the Poisson
regression. Standard errors, clustered by αit, are reported in parentheses. * Significant at
the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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Similar to the results above, international corporate taxes impact negatively upon the num-
ber of CBAs regardless whether they are measured on the basis of statutory or effective
average rates in, respectively, Column 1 and 2.22 Recall that the international tax burden
applies only when profits are repatriated, which is notoriously difficulty to verify. Hence,
the differences between the results of Tables 3 and 4 could provide some indirect evidence
on the relevance of deferring the repatriation of profits in order to reduce the tax burden.
In this regard, for CBAs, there is no evidence that the deferral reduces the importance of
the (international) tax burden on corporate profits. Rather, with coefficients of around -0.4,
the impact of the international tax burden τijt is more than double the corresponding value
of the host country tax τjt used in Table 3. Barrios et al. (2012, p.953) found an even larger
elasticity of around −0.8 on the international corporate tax burden. However, their sample
covered only 909 new foreign subsidiaries within European countries whilst our data cover
more than 80,000 CBAs from countries around the world.
The remaining columns of Table 4, following Barrios et al. (2012), split the international
corporate tax burden τijt into its individual components. Distinguishing again between
statutory and effective average rates, together with corporate taxes in the host country τjt,
Columns 3 and 4 introduce a separate variable for the double tax burden τijt − τjt arising
when profits are repatriated to a given parent country. The effect is again negative. As
discussed in Section 4, the additional taxes a multinational firm has to pay depend mainly
on the tax system of the parent country and the withholding tax rates in the country
from which the profits are repatriated. Columns 5 and 6 distinguish these components by
attributing double taxes to the effect of withholding taxes (1 − τjt)ωijt and the corporate
taxes remaining to be paid in the parent country τijt−τjt−(1−τjt)ωijt. Note that the latter
can vary across locations since the parent country tax rate depends, for example, on whether
a bilateral income tax treaty has been signed with a given host country. A significantly
negative effect arises for the additional taxes in the parent country, which is consistent with
the findings (but not the magnitude of the coefficients of the corporate tax components:
the ones being smaller than in the aggregate cases of Columns (1) and (2)) of Barrios et
al. (2012 , pp.954, 956). The effect of withholding taxes is also significantly negative. The
corresponding effect in Barrios et al. (2012) is insignificant which is perhaps not surprising
since their sample contained only European countries where withholding taxes tend to be
low and, for EU countries, even zero by virtue of the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive.
6.3 Horizontal and vertical CBAs
Following the procedure outlined in Section 3, Table 5 reports the results that relate to
the distinction between the horizontal (Columns 1 to 4) and vertical (in Columns 5 to 8)
strategies for FDI using the 5 per cent benchmark for V to identify deals that are deemed
vertically related. Recall that the sample contains only deals where a ‘purely’ horizontal
or vertical relationship between acquiring and target firms could be identified. The results
have been calculated with statutory and effective average corporate tax rates. Furthermore,
to account for the role of double taxation, a distinction is made between corporate taxes
measured by the host country rate (as in Table 3) and the international rate (as in Columns
1 and 2 of Table 4).23
Some intuitive differences arise with respect to the impact of the control variables when
CBAs are driven by different FDI strategies.24 In particular, as expected, GDP has only
22We have not calculated the international tax burden with the EMTR, since the withholding taxes, which
enters the international tax burden, accrues to the after-tax profits that are repatriated. Meanwhile, the
EMTR measures the difference in post- and pre-tax rates of return, which is somewhat disconnected with
the actual tax payments that define the value of, for example, tax credits.
23The detailed decomposition of the international tax effects on horizontal and vertical acquisitions along
the lines reported in Table 4 are presented in a summary table below.
24To test whether horizontal and vertical deals give rise to different models, the fact that they are
strictly non-nested needs taking into account. For this scenario, the likelihood ratio statistic LR =
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Table 4: Results with the international tax burden
Corporate Tax: StatutoryEATR StatutoryEATR StatutoryEATR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.28*** 0.27***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Net Wage 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.003 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Distance -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.58*** -0.61*** -0.58*** -0.61***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Border 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Investment Freedom 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.12***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Trade Freedom -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Labour Market Freedom 0.35*** 0.35*** 0.22* 0.29** 0.20 0.29**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Shareholder Rights 1.40*** 1.36*** 1.26*** 1.19*** 1.12*** 1.04***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
EUit*EUjt -0.52 -0.54 -0.50 -0.60 -0.54 -0.65
(0.57) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
(1-EUit)*EUjt 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.10
(0.57) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
Euroit*Eurojt 0.27** 0.27** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.25***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(1-Euroit)*Eurojt -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.31*** -0.28***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Exchange Rate -0.50*** -0.53*** -0.51*** -0.57*** -0.55*** -0.62***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Corporate Tax -0.40*** -0.41***
(International: τijt) (0.03) (0.03)
Corporate Tax -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.24*** -0.23***
(Host: τjt) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Corporate Tax -0.12*** -0.14***
(Double: τijt − τjt) (0.01) (0.01)
Corporate Tax -0.09*** -0.06***
(Parent: τijt−τjt−(1−τjt)ωijt) (0.01) (0.01)
Withholding Tax -0.15*** -0.17***
((1− τjt)ωijt) (0.01) (0.01)
Sales Tax -0.19*** -0.15** -0.17** -0.15** -0.25*** -0.27***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Labour Tax 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
#cba 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182
#obs 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248
lnL -25,979 -26,013 -23,717 -25,838 -23,628 -25,786
Notes: The dependent variable is the number nijt of CBA deals between source country i and
host country j during year t. Estimation is by maximum likelihood of a Poisson regression with
fixed effects αit. Aside from the dummy variables (Border, EU, Euro), the explanatory variables
have been transformed into logarithms such that the coefficients reflect constant elasticities. All
specifications include host country dummy variables δj . For the 1999 to 2010 period, the data cover
all CBAs between the 32 source and 31 host countries listed in the data appendix. Furthermore,
#cba is the total number of deals, #obs is the number of observations, and lnL the maximised
value of the log likelihood function of the Poisson regression. Standard errors, clustered by αit,
are reported in parantheses. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; ***
Significant at the 1% level. 15
a significant effect on horizontal CBAs, since they reflect the desire to access, preferably,
large markets. Trade freedom has a negative effect on horizontal CBAs (though this is only
significant at the 10 per cent level), which is maybe not surprising since it is relatively more
attractive to serve a market via exports, rather than local production, the lower the trade
barriers. Though the host countries encompass developed countries, a substantial fraction
of CBAs in our sample seems to be driven by vertical strategies (see also Table 2). This
is consistent with the findings of Alfaro and Charlton (2009), who suggested that a class
of what they call high-skill intra-industry vertical strategies arises between countries that
are similar in terms of, for example, wage cost. Against this background, the distinction
between horizontal and vertical acquisition strategies does not give rise to large differences
as regards the effect of wage costs.25 Still, labour markets matter for separating the motives
for horizontal and vertical acquisitions, but this effect is captured through labour market
flexibility, which has a significant effect on vertical, but not horizontal CBAs.
With respect to the hypothesis of Mutti and Grubert (2004), for our comprehensive sample of
CBAs, there is some evidence that the effect of corporate taxes is greater on multinational
firms pursuing vertical strategy of multinational integration. The tax elasticities are in
general more negative for vertical FDI. Furthermore, similar to the result of Table 4, for both
horizontal and vertical FDI, corporate taxes matter more when additional parent country
and withholding tax issues are taken into account. In particular, when measuring taxes
with the host country rate (in the odd columns), the effect is insignificant. Again, there is
no evidence that the possibility to defer the repatriation of profits lowers the impact of the
international tax burden for horizontal or vertical FDI.
With respect to indirect taxes, labour taxes are insignificant for both forms of acquisitions.
However, a striking difference that arises in Table 5 is that sales taxes do have a negative
and highly significant impact on horizontal FDI while the corresponding coefficient is lower,
and insignificant, for vertical acquisitions. This result, which has to our knowledge not
been observed before, is intuitive since exported goods are often exempted from local sales
taxes and the primary rationale for vertical integration relates exactly to the production of
intermediate inputs to downstream stages of the supply chain located in other countries.
Conversely, with horizontal acquisitions, multinational firms integrate a foreign plant to
produce and sell goods locally such that the sales tax should matter, which is confirmed
with the results produced here.
6.4 Robustness checks
The results reported above are robust to a number of changes in variable definitions and,
in the case of distinguishing between horizontal and vertical acquisitions, to changes in the
vertical-relatedness benchmark.
Controlling for the role of institutional quality in FDI is a thorny issue. A broad range
of often highly correlated variables encompassing such things as the protection of property
rights, the pervasiveness of corruption, regulatory efficiency, or the openness of a country to
(1/
√
n)
∑n
i=1 ln[l(CBA
hor
i |xijt, τijt, βhor, γhor)/l(CBAveri |xijt, τijt, βver, γver)]/ω̂2, where n is the number
of observations and ω̂2 = (1/n)
∑n
i=1 ln[l(CBA
hor
i |xijt, τijt, βhor, γhor)/l(CBAveri |xijt, τijt, βver, γver)]2,
converges to a standard normal distribution (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, p.184). For all pairs of horizontal
and vertical location choice models in Table 5, the value of the corresponding test statistic is slightly higher
than 5, which suggests that the models pertaining to horizontal and vertical deals differ statistically in a
highly significant manner.
25The outsourcing of labour intensive production stages to low wage countries arises probably mainly with
emerging markets for which panel data on e.g. the EATR are not available. However, for the year 2004,
some cross-sectional tax data for a larger set of host countries appears in Djankov et al. (2010). Based on
this, we have experimented with a cross section of 43 host countries including large emerging markets such
as Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Thailand, or Turkey. With this, a differential effect does arise in terms
wage costs having a significant impact on vertical, but not on horizontal FDI. Furthermore, similar to the
findings below, sales taxes enter with a negative sign for horizontal, but not for vertical FDI.
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foreign business have been found to affect FDI (see, for example, Daude and Stein, 2007).
To comprehensively account for the plethora of institutional quality variables, we have also
recalculated the results with a composite index of economic freedom, which summarises
variables pertaining to the rule of law, government efficiency, regulatory efficiency, and open
markets. However, this did not change the essence of our tax results.
Note from the discussion of Section 5 that all our results have been calculated with fixed
effects αit that absorb any variable that does not differ across host countries.
26 Among
many other things, this accounts for trade freedom in the source country, which could
inhibit vertical acquisitions involving exports from the host country back to the source
country. Aside of producing a connection with the location choice model, the specification
of the fixed effect with αit has also the advantage of eliminating the issue as to whether
the explanatory variables need transforming into logarithmic differences. For taxes, both
the levels (Buettner and Ruf, 2007) and differences (Huizinga and Voget, 2009) have been
used. However, since the fixed effect αit absorbs all source and year specific heterogeneity,
the same coefficient estimates arise when the tax burden is expresses in (log) levels of a host
country or the corresponding (log) difference between source and host country.
Our data also cover some of the years, during which the global economy witnessed the
extraordinary events of the global financial crisis. Though it is still too early to assess
whether this has lead to structural shifts in the international market for corporate control,
we have calculated our results for the period 1999 to 2007 only. Again, this did not affect
the main conclusions above.
A key feature in terms of highlighting the differences across alternative forms of CBAs
is the characterisation of horizontal and vertical acquisitions. In the results reported in
Table 5, the 5 per cent value was used for V to define vertical relatedness. Changing the
vertical relatedness benchmark reallocates the proportion of CBAs between the horizontal
and vertical strategies (see Section 3). The results with the alternative values for V are
reported in Appendix Tables 5a and 5b. Table 5a relate to an increase of V to 10 per
cent. This makes the definition of vertical acquisitions more stringent to pass and increases
the number of CBA deals that are classified as horizontal. In terms of the underlying
determinants, market size continues to be a determinant of horizontal, but not vertical
acquisitions. The tax elasticities (relating to the international tax measure) are significant
for both forms of acquisitions but are now approximately equal. However, of particular note
is that the sales tax still acts as a negative deterrent of horizontal acquisitions but has a
weaker effect on vertical acquisitions, the negative effect being statistically significant at the
10 per cent level only. The results with the 1 per cent value for V are reported in Appendix
Table 5b. With this benchmark, deals that are deemed to be vertical dominate and the
delineation between the alternative forms becomes less clear. In terms of the corporate tax
elasticities, they are higher with vertical acquisitions compared with the horizontal sample.
The difference in sales taxes still appears but is now only significant at the 10 per cent level
for the horizontal acquisitions, but remains insignificant for vertical acquisitions. Finally, the
difference between horizontal and vertical FDI pertains perhaps more to the manufacturing
sector, where production processes can be replicated locally or our-sourced, rather than
services. However, recalculating Table 5 for the manufacturing sector only did not change
the essence of the results.
6.5 Summary of tax elasticities
Distinguishing between the different tax measures and FDI strategies, Table 6 provides an
overview of the elasticities pertaining to the impact of corporate income and sales taxes.
In the cases where several estimates appear across the different specifications of Tables 3
26The dummy variables δj further account for any specific variable shifting the intercept of the host
country.
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to 5, the range with the highest and lowest values of the results is reported. A relatively
consistent picture arises where the corporate tax elasticity on FDI is around −2/5 when
profits are repatriated. This effect can be disentangled into a host country tax effect with
an elasticity of around −1/4 as well as the effect of additional taxes to be paid in the
source (or parent) country as well as withholding taxes which impact upon CBAs with an
elasticity of less than −1/10 and around −1/6, respectively. Across FDI strategies, the effect
of corporate taxes is higher for vertical CBAs. Finally, the sales tax elasticity is around −1/5
with substantially higher effects of up to −2/3 for FDI driven by a horizontal strategy whilst
the effect is insignificant and close to zero for vertical FDI.
Table 6: Overview of tax elasticities
All CBAs Horizontal
CBAs
Vertical
CBAs
Corporate tax measured by statutory rate
International tax -0.40 -0.23 -0.45
Host country tax -0.21 to -0.27 -0.01 -0.20
Source country tax -0.09
Withholding tax -0.15
Corporate tax measured by EATR
International tax -0.41 -0.27 -0.38
Host country tax -0.17 to -0.28 -0.01 -0.09
Source country tax -0.06
Withholding tax -0.17
Sales tax
Sales tax -0.15 to -0.27 -0.61 to -0.64 -0.12 to -0.16
Notes: This table provides an overview of the measured tax elasticities according to (12)
across the results reported in Tables 3 to 5. For all contingencies the maximum and
minimum value is reported. Insignificant coefficients are marked by italic letters.
Though our results coincide with the broadly shared view that taxes reduce the incentive
of multinational firms to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI), there is substantial
variation in the estimates of the corresponding tax elasticities. For example, for taxes levied
directly on corporate profits, elasticities between 0 to -5 percent have been found (see De
Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2008) for an overview). But, as we show here, the impact of taxes
depends on the characteristics of international taxation and it also varies across different
forms of FDI. In addition, sales taxes impact on horizontal but not vertical FDI. Overall, the
implications of the above range of tax elasticities is that changing direct and indirect taxes
or amending details associated with international taxation will not only affect the overall
level of FDI but impact on the composition between horizontal and vertical FDI.
7 Summary
Attracting FDI can be a goal for policy-makers and taxes provide an instrument to achieve
this. Previous research has emphasised the role of modest direct corporate taxes to increase
a country’s appeal as host for FDI. For a large sample with more than 80,000 cross-border ac-
quisitions (CBAs), between 30 major countries during 1999 to 2010 period, which reflects—to
the best of our knowledge—the most comprehensive study on the effect of taxes upon host
country choices encapsulated in CBA deals, the key insights that arise from this paper can
be summarised as follows:
i. The effect of various forms of taxes upon the desire of multinational enterprises to
acquire a target firm in a given host country is broadly negative.
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ii. For corporate taxes, the elasticity lies broadly between −1/20 and −9/20 and for sales
taxes around −1/4.
iii. The effect of corporate taxes depends on the exact measure of taxation, whether the
role of the international tax burden is taken into account, as well as the FDI strat-
egy pursued by the multinational enterprise. In particular, double taxation—which
arises when the same profit is also taxed in the parent country and when withholding
taxes have to be paid in the host country when repatriating profits—increases the
detrimental effect of corporate taxes on FDI.
iv. For the case of sales taxes, the effect arises primarily with FDI that are driven by
a horizontal strategy, implying that an affiliate is integrated into the multinational
enterprise to sell to the local market. No significant effect on the sales tax could be
found with vertical FDI, which involve subsidiaries producing export goods, on which
the sales tax can normally be reimbursed at the border.
There are two broad policy conclusions that could be derived from our results. First, while
confirming that taxes have a negative impact on FDI, the results suggest a more nuanced
interpretation as the effects of taxes will depend not only on the details of the international
tax system, but also on the nature of the FDI strategies which, in turn, depends on the
factors that drive these decisions. Rather than asking about the effect of corporate taxes on
multinational firms, it seems important to recognise that the reactions, for example within
the international market for corporate control, can be rather versatile. Second, insofar as
the issue of fiscal devaluation gathers pace involving greater use of value added taxes, this
may impact on FDI but will be contingent on the motivations for FDI.
The role of taxation within a globalised economy that is largely organised around multi-
national enterprises (MNEs) remains high on the policy agenda. Several on-going debates
focus on a number of issues such as tax base erosion, international tax competition, how
to deal with double taxation, transfer pricing, or headquarter inversion to reduce the cor-
porate tax burden. Within the tax and public finance literature, there is indeed a broad
consensus that taxes affect the decision of MNEs to invest in a given country. Though this
study confirms this finding for a large number of cross border acquisitions, one of the key
findings is that tax effects are cumbersome since firms pursue different strategies and var-
ious taxes arise. Further differences that have not been considered here are those between
industries and firms that might give rise to even more heterogeneity. These, and many other
issues, seem to leave ample scope for additional theoretical and empirical research on the
interconnections between taxes and CBAs.
20
References
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and T. Mitton (2009), Determinants of vertical integration:
financial development and contracting costs, Journal of Finance 63: 1251- 1290.
Alfaro, L. and A. Charlton (2009), Intra-industry foreign direct investment, American
Economic Review 99: 2096-2119.
Antra`s and Yeaple, 2014, Multinational Firms and the Structure of International Trade, in:
Gopinath, Gita, Elhanan Helpman, and Kenneth Rogoff, Handbook of International
Economics, Elsevier, Amsterdam, Volume 4.
Barrios, S, H. Huizinga, L. Laeven and G. Nicode`me (2012), International taxation and
multinational firm location decisions, Journal of Public Economics 96, 946-958.
Becker, J. and C. Fuest (2010), Taxing foreign profits with international mergers and
acquisitions, International Economic Review 51, 171-186.
Becker, J. and C. Fuest (2011), Source versus residence based taxation with international
mergers and acquisitions, Journal of Public Economics 95, 28-40.
Blonigen, B. (1997), Firm-specific assets and the link between exchange rates and foreign
direct investment, American Economic Review 87: 447-465.
Blonigen, B. and R. Davies (2004), The effects of bilateral tax treaties on US FDI Activity,
International Tax and Public Finance 11: 601-622.
Buettner, T. and M. Ruf (2007), Tax incentives and the location of FDI: evidence from the
panel of German multinationals, International Tax and Public Finance 14: 151-164.
Buettner, T. and G. Wamser (2009), Tax impact of nonprofit taxes on foreign direct invest-
ment: evidence from German multinationals, International Tax and Public Finance
14: 151-164.
Cameron, C.A. and P.K. Trivedi (1998), Regression analysis of count data, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Coeurdacier, N., R.A. De Santis, and A. Aviat (2009), Cross-border mergers and acquisi-
tions and European integration, Economic Policy 57, 56-106.
Daude, C. and E. Stein (2007), The quality of institutions and foreign direct investment,
Economics and Politics 19, 317-344.
De Mooij, R. and S. Ederveen (2003), Taxation and foreign direct investment: a synthesis
of empirical research, International Tax and Public Finance 10: 673-696.
De Mooij, R. and S. Ederveen (2008), Corporate tax elasticities: a reader’s guide to em-
pirical findings, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24: 680-697.
Desai, M.A., and J.R. Hines (2005), Value Added Taxes and International Trade: The
Evidence, Mimeo.
Desai, M.A., C.F. Foley and J.R. Hines (2004), Foreign direct investment in a world of
multiple taxes, Journal of Public Economics 88: 2,727-2,744.
Devereux, M.P., (2006), The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms, and
Profit: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, Oxford Centre For Business Taxation Working
Paper 07/02.
Devereux, M. and R. Griffith (1998), Taxes and the location of production: evidence from
a panel of US multinationals, Journal of Public Economics 68: 335-367.
21
Devereux, M., R. Griffith and H. Simpson (2007), Firm location decisions, regional grants
and agglomeration exernalities, Journal of Public Economics 91: 413-435.
Devereux, M., R. Griffith and A. Klemm (2002), Corporate income tax: reforms and tax
competition, Economic Policy 17: 449-495.
Di Giovanni, J. (2005), What drives capital flows? The case of cross-border M&A activity
and financial deepening, Journal of International Economics 65, 127-149.
Djankov, S., T. Ganser, C. McLeish, R.Ramalho and A. Schleifer (2010), The effect of
corporate taxes on investment and entrepreneurship, American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics 2: 31-64.
Erel, I., R.C. Liao and M.C. Weisbach (2011), Determinants of Cross-Border Mergers and
Acquisitions, The Journal of Finance 68, 1045-1082.
Fan, J.P.H. and L.H.P. Lang (2000), The measurement of relatedness: an application to
corporate diversification, Journal of Business 73: 629-660.
Fan, J.P.H. and V.K. Goyal (2006), On the patterns and wealth effects of vertical mergers,
Journal of Business 97: 877-902.
Froot, K. A. and J.C. Stein (1991), Exchange rates and foreign direct investment: an
imperfect capital markets approach, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 1191-1217.
Garfinkel, J.A., and K.W. Hankins (2011), The role of management in mergers and merger
waves, Journal of Financial Economics 101, 515-532.
Guimara˜es, P., O. Figueirdo and D. Woodward (2003), A Tractable Approach to the Firm
Location Decision Problem, The Review of Economics and Statistics 85: 201-204.
Head, K., and J. Ries (2008), FDI as an outcome of the market for corporate control:
Theory and Evidence, Journal of International Economics 74, 2-20.
Herger, N., C. Kotsogiannis and S. McCorriston (2008), Cross-Border Acquisitions in the
Global Food Sector, European Review of Agricultural Economics 35: 563-587.
Herger, N., C. Kotsogiannis and S. McCorriston (2011), International Taxation and FDI
Strategies: Evidence From US Cross-Border Acquisitions, Economics Department Dis-
cussion Paper 11/09, University of Exeter.
Herger, N., and S. McCorriston (2013), On discrete location choice models, Economics
Letters 120: 288-291.
Hijzen, A., H. Go¨rg and M. Manchin (2008), Cross-border mergers & acquisitions and the
role of trade costs, European Economic Review 52: 849-866.
Huizinga, H.P. and J. Voget (2009), International taxation and the direction and volume
of cross-border M&As, Journal of Finance 64: 1217-1249.
Huizinga, H.P., J. Voget and W. Wagner (2012), Who Bears the Burden of International
Taxation? Evidence from Cross-Border M&As. Journal of International Economics
88: 186-197.
Keen, M., and M. Syed (2006), Domestic Taxes and International Trade: Some Evidence,
IMF Working Paper WP/06/47.
KPMG, (various years), Corporate and Indirect Tax Survey.
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1998), Law and Finance,
Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155.
22
Mutti, J. and H. Grubert (2004), Empirical asymmetries in foreign direct investment and
taxation, Journal of International Economics 62: 337-358.
Neary, J.P. (2007), Cross-Border Mergers as Instruments of Comparative Advantage, Re-
view of Economic Studies, 74, 1229-1257.
Rossi, S., and P.F Volpin (2004), Cross-country determinants of mergers and acquisitions,
Journal of Financial Economics 74, 277-304.
Schmidheiny, K., and M. Bru¨lhart (2011), On the equivalence of location choice models:
Conditional logit, nested logit and Poisson, Journal of Urban Economics 69: 214-222.
UBS (various years), Prices and Earnings around the globe, Zurich.
UNCTAD (2000), World Investment Report, Geneva.
Yeaple, S. R. (2003). The complex integration strategies of multinationals and cross country
dependencies in the structure of foreign direct investment. Journal of International
Economics 60: 293-314.
ZEW, (2008). Effective levels of company taxation within an enlarged EU. Study for the
European Commission.
23
Appendices
Appendix A: Country coverage and summary statistics
Country coverage
The common sample covers the following countries. Wage data of UBS (various years) refer
to the cities in parentheses:
As source: Australia (Sydney), Austria (Vienna), Belgium (Brussels), Brazil (Sao Paulo),
Canada (Toronto), China (Shanghai), Czech Republic (Prague), Denmark (Copenhagen),
Finland (Helsinki), France (Paris), Germany (Frankfurt), Greece (Athens), Hongkong (Hong-
kong), Hungary (Budapest), Indonesia (Djakarta), Ireland (Dublin), Italy (Milan), Japan
(Tokyo), Mexico (Mexico City), Netherlands (Amsterdam), Norway (Oslo), Poland (War-
saw), Portugal (Lisbon), Russia (Moscow), Singapore (Singapore), Slovakia (Bratislava),
South Africa (Johannesburg), Spain (Madrid), Sweden (Stockholm), Switzerland (Zurich),
United Kingdom (London), United States (Washington).
The common sample covers the following host countries. Wage data of UBS (various years)
refer to the cities in parentheses:
As host: Argentina (Buenos Aires), Australia (Sydney), Austria (Vienna), Belgium (Brus-
sels), Brazil (Sao Paulo), Canada (Toronto), Chile (Santiago de Chile), Denmark (Copen-
hagen), Finland (Helsinki), France (Paris), Germany (Frankfurt), Greece (Athens), In-
dia (Mumbai), Indonesia (Djakarta), Ireland (Dublin), Israel (Tel Aviv), Italy (Milan),
Japan (Tokyo), Korea (Seoul), Mexico (Mexico City), Netherlands (Amsterdam), New
Zealand (Auckland), Norway (Oslo), Portugal (Lisbon), South Africa (Johannesburg), Spain
(Madrid), Sweden (Stockholm), Switzerland (Zurich), Turkey (Istanbul), United Kingdom
(London), United States (Washington).
Summary statistics of the raw data
CBA GDP Net Wage Distance Border Invest.
Freed.
Trade
Freed.
Labour
Freed.
Sharehol-
der
Righ.
EU*EU
Mean 7.10 9.8e+11 2.16 6.81 0.05 67.90 78.45 65.76 3.03 0.23
Std 25.77 2.0e+12 3.88 5.09 0.23 14.64 8.26 16.44 1.38 0.42
Min 0 5.0e+10 0.01 0.06 0 30 24 37 0 0
Max 513 1.2e+13 84.74 19.84 1 95 90 100 5 1
(1-EU)
*EU
EURO*
EURO
(1-EURO)
*EURO
Exchange
Rate
Corporate Tax Sales
Tax
Labour
Tax
Statutory EATR EMTR
Mean 0.23 0.11 0.24 1.05 30.90 27.50 18.39 16.49 24.63
Std 0.42 0.32 0.43 0.55 6.72 5.68 5.42 5.48 8.062
Min 0 0 0 0.16 10 8.63 4.78 5 8
Max 1 1 1 4.70 51.56 43.77 32.44 25 46
24
Appendix B: Data Description and Additional Results
25
Variable Description Source
Dependent Variable:
nijt Number of cross border acquisition deals between the source country i and host
country j during year t.
Compiled .
Tax Variables
Corporate Tax
(Statutory)
Statutory tax rate on corporate income in country j. KPMG, Corporate and
Indirect Tax Survey.
Corporate Tax
(EATR)
Effective average tax rate (EATR) on corporate income in country j. CBT Tax Database
(2012)).
Corporate Tax
(EMTR)
Effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on corporate income in country j. This is
calculated by the difference between the pre-tax and post-tax required rates of
return.
CBT Tax Database
(2012).
Sales Tax Value added tax (VAT) rate and other sales taxes. IMF, Tax Policy Divi-
sion.
Labour Tax Compulsory social security and income tax contributions in percent of gross
salaries as published in the Prices and Earnings survey of UBS. For the first
part of our sample, the Prices and Earnings survey is only published triennially.
Values of the missing years have been filled with the closest observation avail-
able. In particular, the values of the years 1999 and 2001 employ the 2000 data,
the values for the years 2002 and 2004 employ the 2003 data, and the values for
the years 2005 and 2007 employ the 2006 data. Since 2008 yearly updates of
the Prices and Earnings survey are available.
UBS, Prices and Earn-
ings. See also Bra-
conier et al. (2005).
Withholding
Tax
Withholding tax between countries assuming that profits are repatriated in form
of dividends
KPMG, Corporate and
Indirect Tax Survey.
Deloitte International
Tax Source.
Control Variables:
Border Common border between source and host country. Compiled.
Distance Great circular between the capital city of the source and host country. Compiled.
EUit ∗ EUjt Variable indicating the EU membership of the source and host country Compiled.
(1−EUit)∗EUjt Variable indicating the EU membership of the host (but not the source) country Compiled.
EUROit ∗
EUROjt
Variable indicating that the source and host country share the Euro as common
currency
compiled.
(1− EUROit) ∗
EUROjt
Variable indicating the EURO membership of the host (but not the source)
country
Compiled.
Exchange Rate Real (bilateral) exchange rate with US$. World Development In-
dicators.
GDP Real gross domestic product in US$ with base year 2000 of the host country j. World Development In-
dicators.
Investment
Freedom
Index of freedom of investment referring to whether there is a foreign invest-
ment code that defines the country’s investment laws and procedures; whether
the government encourages foreign investment through fair and equitable treat-
ment of investors; whether there are restrictions on access to foreign exchange;
whether foreign firms are treated the same as domestic firms under the law
whether the government imposes restrictions on payments, transfers, and capi-
tal transactions; and whether specific industries are closed to foreign investment.
Heritage Foundation.
Labour Free-
dom
Index of labor market freedom on a scale from 10 to 90 measuring dimension
such as minimum wages, regulation against layoffs, regulatory burden on hirings
etc.
Heritage Foundation.
Net Wage Wage in the host country net of compulsory social security contributions as
published in the Prices and Earnings survey of UBS. Wages are measured by
an index referring to the hourly income of 13 comparable professions as paid in
the capital city or the financial center of a country. For the first part of our
sample, the Prices and Earnings survey is only published triennially. Values
of the missing years have been filled with the closest observation available. In
particular, the values of the years 1999 and 2001 employ the 2000 data, the
values for the years 2002 and 2004 employ the 2003 data, and the values for the
years 2005 and 2007 employ the 2006 data. Since 2008 yearly updates of the
Prices and Earnings survey are available.
UBS, Prices and Earn-
ings. See also Bra-
conier et al. (2005).
Shareholder
Rights
Shareholder rights are measured by an anti-directors rights index reflecting (i)
the possibility of shareholders to mail their proxy vote, (ii) whether shareholders
are required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders Meeting
(iii) whether cumulative voting is allowed (iv) an oppressed minorities mech-
anism exists (5) whether the minimum stake allowing shareholders to call for
an extraordinary shareholders meeting is more or less than 10%. Higher values
mean more power for shareholders.
La Porta et al. (1998)
Trade Freedom Index of freedom of international trade (tariff and non-tariff barriers) on a scale
from 10 to 90.
Heritage Foundation.
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Appendix C: On the choice of the Poisson regression
Econometric models that are capable to handle location choices include the conditional logit
model, where hdijt is the dependent variable. The conditional logit models takes the joint
distribution over all deals d, source countries i, host countries j, and the 11 years t under
consideration enter the log likelihood function lnLcl =
∑D
d=1
∑N
i=1
∑J
j=1
∑T
t=1 ln(P
d
ijt) with
P dijt defined by (9). Since P
d
ijt = Pijt, the number nijt of CBAs can be factored out, that is
Lcl =
∑I
i=1
∑J
j=1
∑T
t=1 nijtPijt. Inserting (9) yields
lnLcl =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
nijt(x˜ijtβ + τ˜ijtγ + δj) (10)
−
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
[
nijt ln
( I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
exp(x˜ijtβ + τ˜ijtγ + δj)
)]
,
from which the coefficients β and γ can be estimated.
In practice, a caveat against the conditional logit model is that it can require massive
amounts of data for estimation. To avoid this caveat, Guimara˜es et al. (2003) have proposed
to turn to the Poisson regression for the coefficient estimation in location choice models. This
assumes that nijt is Poisson distributed, that is Prob[n = nijt] = [exp(−λijt)λnijtjt ]/nijt!
whilst an exponential mean transformation connects the Poisson parameter λijt with the
explanatory variables of (8), that is E[nijt] = λijt = exp(x˜ijtβ + τ˜ijtγ + δi + δj + δt) =
αit exp(x˜jtβ + τ˜ijtγ + δj). For our case with panel data, αit = exp(δi + δt) absorbs the
heterogeneity from different source countries and years and is here treated as fixed effect.
Guimara˜es et al. (2003) have shown that the concentrated log-likelihood function, which no
longer depends on αit, equals
lnLpc =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
nijt(x˜ijtβ + τ˜ijtγ + δj) (11)
−
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
[
nijt ln
( I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
exp(x˜ijtβ + τ˜ijtγ + δj)
)]
+ C.
Since (11) differs from (10) only as regards the constant C, the estimates of β and γ of a
Poisson regression and a conditional logit model are identical!
Owing to different asymptotic assumptions, in small samples, the standard deviations can
differ between the logit model and the Poisson regression. However, Schmidheiny and
Bru¨lhart (2011, p.219) show that clustering at the group level αit yields asymptotically
identical standard errors. For our case with thousands of count variables that reflect many
more location choices embodied in CBA deals, these asymptotic properties are likely to hold
as long as the standard errors are appropriately clustered.
As long as the variables are transformed into logarithms, the coefficients (β and γ) of the
Poisson regression have the interpretation of an elasticity with respect to the expected
number of acquisitions E[nijt]. Hence, the (direct) tax elasticity η, given by
η =
∂E[nijt]
∂τijt
τijt
E[nijt]
= γ, (12)
is constant.27
27Though the coefficient estimates are identical, Schmidheiny and Bru¨lhart (2011) observe that the elas-
ticities differ between the Poisson regression and the conditional logit model. In particular, the tax elasticity
of the conditional logit model, which is ηclijt = (1 − Pijt)γ, cannot be larger than (12). As long as Pijt
is small, which tends to be the case in a samples comprising a large number of countries and years, the
difference between the elasticity of a Poisson regression and a conditional logit model will be small.
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Results for statutory and effective tax rates
Corporate tax: Statutory rate EATR EMTR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.29***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Net Wage 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Distance -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Border 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Economic Freedom 0.44*** 0.30** 0.42*** 0.30* 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Shareholder Rights 1.47*** 1.45*** 1.44*** 1.40*** 1.40*** 1.34***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
EUit*EUjt -0.49 -0.48 -0.49 -0.48 -0.48 -0.47
(0.61) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57)
(1-EUit)*EUjt 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.61) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57)
Euroit*Eurojt 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.26***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(1-Euroit)*Eurojt -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.38***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Exchange Rate -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.54*** -0.55*** -0.56*** -0.56***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Corporate Tax (τjt) -0.13** -0.18*** -0.11* -0.13** -0.04 -0.04
(Host Country) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Sales Tax -0.28*** -0.25** -0.23***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Labour Tax 0.09 0.09 0.09
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
#cba 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182
#obs 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248
lnL -26,095 -26,087 -26,096 -26,090 -26,097 -26,091
Notes: The dependent variable is the number nijt of CBA deals between source country i and
host country j during year t. Estimation is by maximum likelihood of a Poisson regression
with fixed effects αit. Aside from the dummy variables (Border, EU, Euro), the explanatory
variables have been transformed into logarithms such that the coefficients reflect constant
elasticities. All specification include host country dummy variables δj . For the 1999 to
2010 period, the data cover all CBAs between the 32 source and 31 host countries listed in
the data appendix. Furthermore, #cba is the total number of deals, #obs is the number
of observations, and lnL the maximised value of the log likelihood function of the Poisson
regression. Standard errors, clustered by αit, are reported in parentheses. * Significant at
the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
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Results with the international tax burden
Corporate tax: StatutoryEATR StatutoryEATR StatutoryEATR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.26** 0.24** 0.25** 0.22**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Net Wage 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Distance -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.58*** -0.61*** -0.58*** -0.61***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Border 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Economic Freedom 0.25* 0.22 0.39** 0.31** 0.43*** 0.36**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
Shareholder Rights 1.46*** 1.41*** 1.22*** 1.19*** 1.11*** 1.07***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)
EUit*EUjt -0.50 -0.51 -0.48 -0.58 -0.53 -0.64
(0.57) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
(1-EUit)*EUjt 0.01 0.001 0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.09
(0.57) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
Euroit*Eurojt 0.27** 0.27** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.26***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(1-Euroit)*Eurojt -0.36*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.32*** -0.30*** -0.28***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Exchange Rate -0.49*** -0.52*** -0.50*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.61***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Corporate Tax -0.40*** -0.40***
(International: τijt) (0.03) (0.03)
Corporate Tax -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.20*** -0.19***
(Host: τjt) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Corporate Tax -0.12*** -0.14***
(Double: τijt − τjt) (0.01) (0.01)
Corporate Tax -0.09*** -0.06***
(Parent: τijt−τjt−(1−τjt)ωijt) (0.01) (0.01)
Withholding Tax -0.15*** -0.17***
((1− τjt)ωijt) (0.01) (0.01)
Sales Tax -0.29*** -0.26** -0.22** -0.24** -0.27*** -0.33***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Labour Tax 0.10** 0.11** 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
#cba 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182
#obs 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248
lnL -25,991 -26,026 -23,723 -25,847 -23,630 -25,791
Notes: The dependent variable is the number nijt of CBA deals between source country i and
host country j during year t. Estimation is by maximum likelihood of a Poisson regression with
fixed effects αit. Aside from the dummy variables (Border, EU, Euro), the explanatory variables
have been transformed into logarithms such that the coefficients reflect constant elasticities. All
specifications include host country dummy variables δj . For the 1999 to 2010 period, the data cover
all CBAs between the 32 source and 31 host countries listed in the data appendix. Furthermore,
#cba is the total number of deals, #obs is the number of observations, and lnL the maximised
value of the log likelihood function of the Poisson regression. Standard errors, clustered by αit,
are reported in parantheses. * Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; ***
Significant at the 1% level.
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